switch (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher)) {

case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:

case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB

case EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE:

#endif

return true;

case EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER:

return EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher) == NID_chacha20_poly1305;

default:

return false;

}

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());

Local<Object> info = args[0].As<Object>();

CHECK(args[1]->IsString() || args[1]->IsInt32());

const EVP_CIPHER* cipher;

if (args[1]->IsString()) {

Utf8Value name(env->isolate(), args[1]);

cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(*name);

} else {

int nid = args[1].As<Int32>()->Value();

cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(nid);

}

if (cipher == nullptr)

return;

int mode = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher);

int iv_length = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);

int key_length = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);

int block_length = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher);

const char* mode_label = nullptr;

switch (mode) {

case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE: mode_label = "cbc"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE: mode_label = "ccm"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE: mode_label = "cfb"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE: mode_label = "ctr"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE: mode_label = "ecb"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE: mode_label = "gcm"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE: mode_label = "ocb"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE: mode_label = "ofb"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE: mode_label = "wrap"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE: mode_label = "xts"; break;

case EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER: mode_label = "stream"; break;

}

// If the testKeyLen and testIvLen arguments are specified,

// then we will make an attempt to see if they are usable for

// the cipher in question, returning undefined if they are not.

// If they are, the info object will be returned with the values

// given.

if (args[2]->IsInt32() || args[3]->IsInt32()) {

// Test and input IV or key length to determine if it's acceptable.

// If it is, then the getCipherInfo will succeed with the given

// values.

CipherCtxPointer ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());

if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx.get(), cipher, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, 1))

return;

if (args[2]->IsInt32()) {

int check_len = args[2].As<Int32>()->Value();

if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx.get(), check_len))

return;

key_length = check_len;

}

if (args[3]->IsInt32()) {

int check_len = args[3].As<Int32>()->Value();

// For CCM modes, the IV may be between 7 and 13 bytes.

// For GCM and OCB modes, we'll check by attempting to

// set the value. For everything else, just check that

// check_len == iv_length.

switch (mode) {

case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:

if (check_len < 7 || check_len > 13)

return;

break;

case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:

// Fall through

case EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE:

if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(

ctx.get(),

EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,

check_len,

nullptr)) {

return;

}

break;

default:

if (check_len != iv_length)

return;

}

iv_length = check_len;

}

}

if (mode_label != nullptr &&

info->Set(

env->context(),

FIXED_ONE_BYTE_STRING(env->isolate(), "mode"),

OneByteString(env->isolate(), mode_label)).IsNothing()) {

return;

}

// OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher)) is used here instead of

// EVP_CIPHER_name(cipher) for compatibility with BoringSSL.

if (info->Set(

env->context(),

env->name_string(),

OneByteString(

env->isolate(),

OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher)))).IsNothing()) {

return;

}

if (info->Set(

env->context(),

FIXED_ONE_BYTE_STRING(env->isolate(), "nid"),

Int32::New(env->isolate(), EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher))).IsNothing()) {

return;

}

// Stream ciphers do not have a meaningful block size

if (mode != EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER &&

info->Set(

env->context(),

FIXED_ONE_BYTE_STRING(env->isolate(), "blockSize"),

Int32::New(env->isolate(), block_length)).IsNothing()) {

return;

}

// Ciphers that do not use an IV shouldn't report a length

if (iv_length != 0 &&

info->Set(

env->context(),

FIXED_ONE_BYTE_STRING(env->isolate(), "ivLength"),

Int32::New(env->isolate(), iv_length)).IsNothing()) {

return;

}

if (info->Set(

env->context(),

FIXED_ONE_BYTE_STRING(env->isolate(), "keyLength"),

Int32::New(env->isolate(), key_length)).IsNothing()) {

return;

}

args.GetReturnValue().Set(info);

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

SSLCtxPointer ctx(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()));

if (!ctx) {

return ThrowCryptoError(env, ERR_get_error(), "SSL_CTX_new");

}

SSLPointer ssl(SSL_new(ctx.get()));

if (!ssl) {

return ThrowCryptoError(env, ERR_get_error(), "SSL_new");

}

STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)* ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl.get());

// TLSv1.3 ciphers aren't listed by EVP. There are only 5, we could just

// document them, but since there are only 5, easier to just add them manually

// and not have to explain their absence in the API docs. They are lower-cased

// because the docs say they will be.

static const char* TLS13_CIPHERS[] = {

"tls_aes_256_gcm_sha384",

"tls_chacha20_poly1305_sha256",

"tls_aes_128_gcm_sha256",

"tls_aes_128_ccm_8_sha256",

"tls_aes_128_ccm_sha256"

};

const int n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers);

std::vector<Local<Value>> arr(n + arraysize(TLS13_CIPHERS));

for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {

const SSL_CIPHER* cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);

arr[i] = OneByteString(env->isolate(), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher));

}

for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(TLS13_CIPHERS); ++i) {

const char* name = TLS13_CIPHERS[i];

arr[n + i] = OneByteString(env->isolate(), name);

}

args.GetReturnValue().Set(Array::New(env->isolate(), arr.data(), arr.size()));

Local<Object> wrap,

CipherKind kind)

: BaseObject(env, wrap),

ctx_(nullptr),

kind_(kind),

auth_tag_state_(kAuthTagUnknown),

auth_tag_len_(kNoAuthTagLength),

pending_auth_failed_(false) {

MakeWeak();

Isolate* isolate = env->isolate();

Local<Context> context = env->context();

Local<FunctionTemplate> t = NewFunctionTemplate(isolate, New);

t->InstanceTemplate()->SetInternalFieldCount(CipherBase::kInternalFieldCount);

SetProtoMethod(isolate, t, "init", Init);

SetProtoMethod(isolate, t, "initiv", InitIv);

SetProtoMethod(isolate, t, "update", Update);

SetProtoMethod(isolate, t, "final", Final);

SetProtoMethod(isolate, t, "setAutoPadding", SetAutoPadding);

SetProtoMethodNoSideEffect(isolate, t, "getAuthTag", GetAuthTag);

SetProtoMethod(isolate, t, "setAuthTag", SetAuthTag);

SetProtoMethod(isolate, t, "setAAD", SetAAD);

SetConstructorFunction(context, target, "CipherBase", t);

SetMethodNoSideEffect(context, target, "getSSLCiphers", GetSSLCiphers);

SetMethodNoSideEffect(context, target, "getCiphers", GetCiphers);

SetMethod(context,

target,

"publicEncrypt",

PublicKeyCipher::Cipher<PublicKeyCipher::kPublic,

EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init,

EVP_PKEY_encrypt>);

SetMethod(context,

target,

"privateDecrypt",

PublicKeyCipher::Cipher<PublicKeyCipher::kPrivate,

EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init,

EVP_PKEY_decrypt>);

SetMethod(context,

target,

"privateEncrypt",

PublicKeyCipher::Cipher<PublicKeyCipher::kPrivate,

EVP_PKEY_sign_init,

EVP_PKEY_sign>);

SetMethod(context,

target,

"publicDecrypt",

PublicKeyCipher::Cipher<PublicKeyCipher::kPublic,

EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init,

EVP_PKEY_verify_recover>);

SetMethodNoSideEffect(context, target, "getCipherInfo", GetCipherInfo);

NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, kWebCryptoCipherEncrypt);

NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, kWebCryptoCipherDecrypt);

ExternalReferenceRegistry* registry) {

registry->Register(New);

registry->Register(Init);

registry->Register(InitIv);

registry->Register(Update);

registry->Register(Final);

registry->Register(SetAutoPadding);

registry->Register(GetAuthTag);

registry->Register(SetAuthTag);

registry->Register(SetAAD);

registry->Register(GetSSLCiphers);

registry->Register(GetCiphers);

registry->Register(PublicKeyCipher::Cipher<PublicKeyCipher::kPublic,

EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init,

EVP_PKEY_encrypt>);

registry->Register(PublicKeyCipher::Cipher<PublicKeyCipher::kPrivate,

EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init,

EVP_PKEY_decrypt>);

registry->Register(PublicKeyCipher::Cipher<PublicKeyCipher::kPrivate,

EVP_PKEY_sign_init,

EVP_PKEY_sign>);

registry->Register(PublicKeyCipher::Cipher<PublicKeyCipher::kPublic,

EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init,

EVP_PKEY_verify_recover>);

registry->Register(GetCipherInfo);

CHECK(args.IsConstructCall());

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

new CipherBase(env, args.This(), args[0]->IsTrue() ? kCipher : kDecipher);

const EVP_CIPHER* cipher,

const unsigned char* key,

int key_len,

const unsigned char* iv,

int iv_len,

unsigned int auth_tag_len) {

CHECK(!ctx_);

ctx_.reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());

const int mode = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher);

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)

EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(ctx_.get(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW);

const bool encrypt = (kind_ == kCipher);

if (1 != EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx_.get(), cipher, nullptr,

nullptr, nullptr, encrypt)) {

return ThrowCryptoError(env(), ERR_get_error(),

"Failed to initialize cipher");

}

if (IsSupportedAuthenticatedMode(cipher)) {

CHECK_GE(iv_len, 0);

if (!InitAuthenticated(cipher_type, iv_len, auth_tag_len))

return;

}

if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx_.get(), key_len)) {

ctx_.reset();

return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_KEYLEN(env());

}

if (1 != EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx_.get(), nullptr, nullptr, key, iv, encrypt)) {

return ThrowCryptoError(env(), ERR_get_error(),

"Failed to initialize cipher");

}

const ArrayBufferOrViewContents<unsigned char>& key_buf,

unsigned int auth_tag_len) {

HandleScope scope(env()->isolate());

MarkPopErrorOnReturn mark_pop_error_on_return;

const EVP_CIPHER* const cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(cipher_type);

if (cipher == nullptr)

return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN_CIPHER(env());

unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];

unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];

int key_len = EVP_BytesToKey(cipher,

EVP_md5(),

nullptr,

key_buf.data(),

key_buf.size(),

1,

key,

iv);

CHECK_NE(key_len, 0);

const int mode = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher);

if (kind_ == kCipher && (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE ||

mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE ||

mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)) {

// Ignore the return value (i.e. possible exception) because we are

// not calling back into JS anyway.

ProcessEmitWarning(env(),

"Use Cipheriv for counter mode of %s",

cipher_type);

}

CommonInit(cipher_type, cipher, key, key_len, iv,

EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), auth_tag_len);

CipherBase* cipher;

ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&cipher, args.Holder());

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

CHECK_GE(args.Length(), 3);

const Utf8Value cipher_type(args.GetIsolate(), args[0]);

ArrayBufferOrViewContents<unsigned char> key_buf(args[1]);

if (!key_buf.CheckSizeInt32())

return THROW_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE(env, "password is too large");

// Don't assign to cipher->auth_tag_len_ directly; the value might not

// represent a valid length at this point.

unsigned int auth_tag_len;

if (args[2]->IsUint32()) {

auth_tag_len = args[2].As<Uint32>()->Value();

} else {

CHECK(args[2]->IsInt32() && args[2].As<Int32>()->Value() == -1);

auth_tag_len = kNoAuthTagLength;

}

cipher->Init(*cipher_type, key_buf, auth_tag_len);

const ByteSource& key_buf,

const ArrayBufferOrViewContents<unsigned char>& iv_buf,

unsigned int auth_tag_len) {

HandleScope scope(env()->isolate());

MarkPopErrorOnReturn mark_pop_error_on_return;

const EVP_CIPHER* const cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(cipher_type);

if (cipher == nullptr)

return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN_CIPHER(env());

const int expected_iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);

const bool is_authenticated_mode = IsSupportedAuthenticatedMode(cipher);

const bool has_iv = iv_buf.size() > 0;

// Throw if no IV was passed and the cipher requires an IV

if (!has_iv && expected_iv_len != 0)

return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_IV(env());

// Throw if an IV was passed which does not match the cipher's fixed IV length

// static_cast<int> for the iv_buf.size() is safe because we've verified

// prior that the value is not larger than INT_MAX.

if (!is_authenticated_mode &&

has_iv &&

static_cast<int>(iv_buf.size()) != expected_iv_len) {

return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_IV(env());

}

if (EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher) == NID_chacha20_poly1305) {

CHECK(has_iv);

// Check for invalid IV lengths, since OpenSSL does not under some

// conditions:

// https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190306.txt.

if (iv_buf.size() > 12)

return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_IV(env());

}

CommonInit(

cipher_type,

cipher,

key_buf.data<unsigned char>(),

key_buf.size(),

iv_buf.data(),

iv_buf.size(),

auth_tag_len);

CipherBase* cipher;

ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&cipher, args.Holder());

Environment* env = cipher->env();

CHECK_GE(args.Length(), 4);

const Utf8Value cipher_type(env->isolate(), args[0]);

// The argument can either be a KeyObjectHandle or a byte source

// (e.g. ArrayBuffer, TypedArray, etc). Whichever it is, grab the

// raw bytes and proceed...

const ByteSource key_buf = ByteSource::FromSecretKeyBytes(env, args[1]);

if (UNLIKELY(key_buf.size() > INT_MAX))

return THROW_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE(env, "key is too big");

ArrayBufferOrViewContents<unsigned char> iv_buf(

!args[2]->IsNull() ? args[2] : Local<Value>());

if (UNLIKELY(!iv_buf.CheckSizeInt32()))

return THROW_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE(env, "iv is too big");

// Don't assign to cipher->auth_tag_len_ directly; the value might not

// represent a valid length at this point.

unsigned int auth_tag_len;

if (args[3]->IsUint32()) {

auth_tag_len = args[3].As<Uint32>()->Value();

} else {

CHECK(args[3]->IsInt32() && args[3].As<Int32>()->Value() == -1);

auth_tag_len = kNoAuthTagLength;

}

cipher->InitIv(*cipher_type, key_buf, iv_buf, auth_tag_len);

const char* cipher_type,

int iv_len,

unsigned int auth_tag_len) {

CHECK(IsAuthenticatedMode());

MarkPopErrorOnReturn mark_pop_error_on_return;

if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_.get(),

EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,

iv_len,

nullptr)) {

THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_IV(env());

return false;

}

const int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx_.get());

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {

if (auth_tag_len != kNoAuthTagLength) {

if (!IsValidGCMTagLength(auth_tag_len)) {

THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_AUTH_TAG(

env(),

"Invalid authentication tag length: %u",

auth_tag_len);

return false;

}

// Remember the given authentication tag length for later.

auth_tag_len_ = auth_tag_len;

}

} else {

if (auth_tag_len == kNoAuthTagLength) {

// We treat ChaCha20-Poly1305 specially. Like GCM, the authentication tag

// length defaults to 16 bytes when encrypting. Unlike GCM, the

// authentication tag length also defaults to 16 bytes when decrypting,

// whereas GCM would accept any valid authentication tag length.

if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx_.get()) == NID_chacha20_poly1305) {

auth_tag_len = 16;

} else {

THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_AUTH_TAG(

env(), "authTagLength required for %s", cipher_type);

return false;

}

}

// TODO(tniessen) Support CCM decryption in FIPS mode

#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE && kind_ == kDecipher &&

EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(nullptr)) {

#else

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE && kind_ == kDecipher && FIPS_mode()) {

#endif

THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION(env(),

"CCM encryption not supported in FIPS mode");

return false;

}

// Tell OpenSSL about the desired length.

if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, auth_tag_len,

nullptr)) {

THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_AUTH_TAG(

env(), "Invalid authentication tag length: %u", auth_tag_len);

return false;

}

// Remember the given authentication tag length for later.

auth_tag_len_ = auth_tag_len;

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {

// Restrict the message length to min(INT_MAX, 2^(8*(15-iv_len))-1) bytes.

CHECK(iv_len >= 7 && iv_len <= 13);

max_message_size_ = INT_MAX;

if (iv_len == 12) max_message_size_ = 16777215;

if (iv_len == 13) max_message_size_ = 65535;

}

}

return true;

}

bool CipherBase::CheckCCMMessageLength(int message_len) {

CHECK(ctx_);

CHECK(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx_.get()) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE);

if (message_len > max_message_size_) {

THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_MESSAGELEN(env());

return false;

}

return true;

}

bool CipherBase::IsAuthenticatedMode() const {

// Check if this cipher operates in an AEAD mode that we support.

CHECK(ctx_);

return IsSupportedAuthenticatedMode(ctx_.get());

}

void CipherBase::GetAuthTag(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

CipherBase* cipher;

ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&cipher, args.Holder());

// Only callable after Final and if encrypting.

if (cipher->ctx_ ||

cipher->kind_ != kCipher ||

cipher->auth_tag_len_ == kNoAuthTagLength) {

return;

}

args.GetReturnValue().Set(

Buffer::Copy(env, cipher->auth_tag_, cipher->auth_tag_len_)

.FromMaybe(Local<Value>()));

}

void CipherBase::SetAuthTag(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {

CipherBase* cipher;

ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&cipher, args.Holder());

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

if (!cipher->ctx_ ||

!cipher->IsAuthenticatedMode() ||

cipher->kind_ != kDecipher ||

cipher->auth_tag_state_ != kAuthTagUnknown) {

return args.GetReturnValue().Set(false);

}

ArrayBufferOrViewContents<char> auth_tag(args[0]);

if (UNLIKELY(!auth_tag.CheckSizeInt32()))

return THROW_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE(env, "buffer is too big");

unsigned int tag_len = auth_tag.size();

const int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher->ctx_.get());

bool is_valid;

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {

// Restrict GCM tag lengths according to NIST 800-38d, page 9.

is_valid = (cipher->auth_tag_len_ == kNoAuthTagLength ||

cipher->auth_tag_len_ == tag_len) &&

IsValidGCMTagLength(tag_len);

} else {

// At this point, the tag length is already known and must match the

// length of the given authentication tag.

CHECK(IsSupportedAuthenticatedMode(cipher->ctx_.get()));

CHECK_NE(cipher->auth_tag_len_, kNoAuthTagLength);

is_valid = cipher->auth_tag_len_ == tag_len;

}

if (!is_valid) {

return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_AUTH_TAG(

env, "Invalid authentication tag length: %u", tag_len);

}

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && cipher->auth_tag_len_ == kNoAuthTagLength &&

tag_len != 16 && env->EmitProcessEnvWarning()) {

if (ProcessEmitDeprecationWarning(

env,

"Using AES-GCM authentication tags of less than 128 bits without "

"specifying the authTagLength option when initializing decryption "

"is deprecated.",

"DEP0182")

.IsNothing())

return;

}

cipher->auth_tag_len_ = tag_len;

cipher->auth_tag_state_ = kAuthTagKnown;

CHECK_LE(cipher->auth_tag_len_, sizeof(cipher->auth_tag_));

memset(cipher->auth_tag_, 0, sizeof(cipher->auth_tag_));

auth_tag.CopyTo(cipher->auth_tag_, cipher->auth_tag_len_);

args.GetReturnValue().Set(true);

}

bool CipherBase::MaybePassAuthTagToOpenSSL() {

if (auth_tag_state_ == kAuthTagKnown) {

if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_.get(),

EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,

auth_tag_len_,

reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(auth_tag_))) {

return false;

}

auth_tag_state_ = kAuthTagPassedToOpenSSL;

}

return true;

}

bool CipherBase::SetAAD(

const ArrayBufferOrViewContents<unsigned char>& data,

int plaintext_len) {

if (!ctx_ || !IsAuthenticatedMode())

return false;

MarkPopErrorOnReturn mark_pop_error_on_return;

int outlen;

const int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx_.get());

// When in CCM mode, we need to set the authentication tag and the plaintext

// length in advance.

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {

if (plaintext_len < 0) {

THROW_ERR_MISSING_ARGS(env(),

"options.plaintextLength required for CCM mode with AAD");

return false;

}

if (!CheckCCMMessageLength(plaintext_len))

return false;

if (kind_ == kDecipher) {

if (!MaybePassAuthTagToOpenSSL())

return false;

}

// Specify the plaintext length.

if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx_.get(), nullptr, &outlen, nullptr, plaintext_len))

return false;

}

return 1 == EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx_.get(),

nullptr,

&outlen,

data.data(),

data.size());

}

void CipherBase::SetAAD(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {

CipherBase* cipher;

ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&cipher, args.Holder());

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 2);

CHECK(args[1]->IsInt32());

int plaintext_len = args[1].As<Int32>()->Value();

ArrayBufferOrViewContents<unsigned char> buf(args[0]);

if (UNLIKELY(!buf.CheckSizeInt32()))

return THROW_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE(env, "buffer is too big");

args.GetReturnValue().Set(cipher->SetAAD(buf, plaintext_len));

}

CipherBase::UpdateResult CipherBase::Update(

const char* data,

size_t len,

std::unique_ptr<BackingStore>* out) {

if (!ctx_ || len > INT_MAX)

return kErrorState;

MarkPopErrorOnReturn mark_pop_error_on_return;

const int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx_.get());

if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE && !CheckCCMMessageLength(len))

return kErrorMessageSize;

// Pass the authentication tag to OpenSSL if possible. This will only happen

// once, usually on the first update.

if (kind_ == kDecipher && IsAuthenticatedMode())

CHECK(MaybePassAuthTagToOpenSSL());

const int block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx_.get());

CHECK_GT(block_size, 0);

if (len + block_size > INT_MAX) return kErrorState;

int buf_len = len + block_size;

// For key wrapping algorithms, get output size by calling

// EVP_CipherUpdate() with null output.

if (kind_ == kCipher && mode == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE &&

EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx_.get(),

nullptr,

&buf_len,

reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(data),

len) != 1) {

return kErrorState;

}

{

NoArrayBufferZeroFillScope no_zero_fill_scope(env()->isolate_data());

*out = ArrayBuffer::NewBackingStore(env()->isolate(), buf_len);

}

int r = EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx_.get(),

static_cast<unsigned char*>((*out)->Data()),

&buf_len,

reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(data),

len);

CHECK_LE(static_cast<size_t>(buf_len), (*out)->ByteLength());

if (buf_len == 0) {

*out = ArrayBuffer::NewBackingStore(env()->isolate(), 0);

} else if (static_cast<size_t>(buf_len) != (*out)->ByteLength()) {

std::unique_ptr<BackingStore> old_out = std::move(*out);

*out = ArrayBuffer::NewBackingStore(env()->isolate(), buf_len);

memcpy(static_cast<char*>((*out)->Data()),

static_cast<char*>(old_out->Data()),

buf_len);

}

// When in CCM mode, EVP_CipherUpdate will fail if the authentication tag is

// invalid. In that case, remember the error and throw in final().

if (!r && kind_ == kDecipher && mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {

pending_auth_failed_ = true;

return kSuccess;

}

return r == 1 ? kSuccess : kErrorState;

}

void CipherBase::Update(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {

Decode<CipherBase>(args, [](CipherBase* cipher,

const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args,

const char* data, size_t size) {

std::unique_ptr<BackingStore> out;

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

if (UNLIKELY(size > INT_MAX))

return THROW_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE(env, "data is too long");

UpdateResult r = cipher->Update(data, size, &out);

if (r != kSuccess) {

if (r == kErrorState) {

ThrowCryptoError(env, ERR_get_error(),

"Trying to add data in unsupported state");

}

return;

}

Local<ArrayBuffer> ab = ArrayBuffer::New(env->isolate(), std::move(out));

args.GetReturnValue().Set(

Buffer::New(env, ab, 0, ab->ByteLength()).FromMaybe(Local<Value>()));

});

}

bool CipherBase::SetAutoPadding(bool auto_padding) {

if (!ctx_)

return false;

MarkPopErrorOnReturn mark_pop_error_on_return;

return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx_.get(), auto_padding);

}

void CipherBase::SetAutoPadding(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {

CipherBase* cipher;

ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&cipher, args.Holder());

bool b = cipher->SetAutoPadding(args.Length() < 1 || args[0]->IsTrue());

args.GetReturnValue().Set(b); // Possibly report invalid state failure

}

bool CipherBase::Final(std::unique_ptr<BackingStore>* out) {

if (!ctx_)

return false;

const int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx_.get());

{

NoArrayBufferZeroFillScope no_zero_fill_scope(env()->isolate_data());

*out = ArrayBuffer::NewBackingStore(env()->isolate(),

static_cast<size_t>(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx_.get())));

}

if (kind_ == kDecipher && IsSupportedAuthenticatedMode(ctx_.get()))

MaybePassAuthTagToOpenSSL();

// OpenSSL v1.x doesn't verify the presence of the auth tag so do

// it ourselves, see https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/45874.

if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L && kind_ == kDecipher &&

NID_chacha20_poly1305 == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx_.get()) &&

auth_tag_state_ != kAuthTagPassedToOpenSSL) {

return false;

}

// In CCM mode, final() only checks whether authentication failed in update().

// EVP_CipherFinal_ex must not be called and will fail.

bool ok;

if (kind_ == kDecipher && mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {

ok = !pending_auth_failed_;

*out = ArrayBuffer::NewBackingStore(env()->isolate(), 0);

} else {

int out_len = (*out)->ByteLength();

ok = EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx_.get(),

static_cast<unsigned char*>((*out)->Data()),

&out_len) == 1;

CHECK_LE(static_cast<size_t>(out_len), (*out)->ByteLength());

if (out_len == 0) {

*out = ArrayBuffer::NewBackingStore(env()->isolate(), 0);

} else if (static_cast<size_t>(out_len) != (*out)->ByteLength()) {

std::unique_ptr<BackingStore> old_out = std::move(*out);

*out = ArrayBuffer::NewBackingStore(env()->isolate(), out_len);

memcpy(static_cast<char*>((*out)->Data()),

static_cast<char*>(old_out->Data()),

out_len);

}

if (ok && kind_ == kCipher && IsAuthenticatedMode()) {

// In GCM mode, the authentication tag length can be specified in advance,

// but defaults to 16 bytes when encrypting. In CCM and OCB mode, it must

// always be given by the user.

if (auth_tag_len_ == kNoAuthTagLength) {

CHECK(mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE);

auth_tag_len_ = sizeof(auth_tag_);

}

ok = (1 == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,

auth_tag_len_,

reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(auth_tag_)));

}

}

ctx_.reset();

return ok;

}

void CipherBase::Final(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {

Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);

CipherBase* cipher;

ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&cipher, args.Holder());

if (cipher->ctx_ == nullptr)

return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_STATE(env);

std::unique_ptr<BackingStore> out;

// Check IsAuthenticatedMode() first, Final() destroys the EVP_CIPHER_CTX.

const bool is_auth_mode = cipher->IsAuthenticatedMode();

bool r = cipher->Final(&out);

if (!r) {

const char* msg = is_auth_mode

? "Unsupported state or unable to authenticate data"

: "Unsupported state";

return ThrowCryptoError(env, ERR_get_error(), msg);

}

Local<ArrayBuffer> ab = ArrayBuffer::New(env->isolate(), std::move(out));

args.GetReturnValue().Set(

Buffer::New(env, ab, 0, ab->ByteLength()).FromMaybe(Local<Value>()));

}

template <PublicKeyCipher::Operation operation,

PublicKeyCipher::EVP_PKEY_cipher_init_t EVP_PKEY_cipher_init,

PublicKeyCipher::EVP_PKEY_cipher_t EVP_PKEY_cipher>

bool PublicKeyCipher::Cipher(

Environment* env,

const ManagedEVPPKey& pkey,

int padding,

const EVP_MD* digest,

const ArrayBufferOrViewContents<unsigned char>& oaep_label,

const ArrayBufferOrViewContents<unsigned char>& data,

std::unique_ptr<BackingStore>* out) {

EVPKeyCtxPointer ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey.get(), nullptr));

if (!ctx)

return false;